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Abstract 
This paper studies enterprise investment decisions under debt agency conflicts by the method of real 
option. It is different from the existed literatures that this paper considers not only the influence of 
investment goals alienation on investment decisions without bankruptcy agency, but also analyzes the 
investment decisions distortion under bankruptcy agency conflicts. The study result shows that 
enterprises with debt usually exist overinvestment; on the one hand, the overinvestment comes from 
excessive pursuing of the tax benefits under the investment goals alienation, on the other hand, it comes 
from the protection for shareholders’ investment risk under strategic default bankruptcy. What’s more, 
under the lower debt level, the former is the dominant mechanism for investment decisions distortion; 
while under the higher debt level, the influence of the later is prominent.  
Keywords 
Investment Goal Alienation, Bankruptcy Decisions Agency, Investment Behavior Distortion, Real 
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1. Introduction 
In the early corperate finance literatures, debt financing is a kind of financing tools to solve the issue of 
financing shortage. Since Modigliani and Miller put forward the MM theory, schoolars have enriched 
the content of the debt financing from a number of aspects, and made the topic of corperate capital 
structure decision-making is full of complexity and artistry, therefore it attracts much more attention. 
One of the most notable theories is agency theory that put forward by Jensen and Meckling, they 
believed that debt financing on the one hand will ease the equity agent problem, resulting in contingent 
goverence effect, on the other hand, debt financing will lead to interests conflict between shareholders 
and creditors, thus generates inefficient in investment and business decisions, which will increase the 
cost of agency. Therefore, how to understand the investment decisions under the debt agency conflict is 
not only related to the optimization of corporate finance decision-making and debt contract design, but 
also is an important way to allocate social economic resource efficiently. 
NPV is a crucial method for enterprise to make investment decisions, while this method ignores the 
flexibility of investment, which usually underestimates project value, even leads to wrong decision. In 
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view of the deficiency of NPV method, scholars such as Black, Scholes, Mertonhave, etc., created the 
theoretical method of real option, so as to provide a more scientific tool for investment and financing 
decision-making. Using the real option method, Brennan and Schwartz firstly analyzed the impact of 
debt agency conflicts on corporate investment decisions, they found that if firm’s current asset 
profitability is low relatively, the debt will lead to investment insufficient. In response to this 
investment insufficient, Mauer, Parsons and Mauer Ott, etc., make a further study in a directly way. In 
contrast, Lelend and Satk found that under the effect of shareholders and creditors conflicts, enterprise 
will have motivation to make overinvestment, which confirms asset substitutions problem provided by 
Jensen and Meckling. Childs et al. confirmed that overinvestment or underinvestment caused by debt 
financing is state-dependent under the context of interaction of investment and financing decision. 
They found that if the investment is replacing high risk level assets with lower risk assets, shareholders 
will make overinvestment, while if the investment assets have the similar risk with the present risk, 
enterprise investment is an expansion for the present assets, and shareholders will make 
underinvestment. Similarly, Peng and Liu studied the expansionary investment, also found that there 
would be overinvestment and underinvestment in different debt level, and confirmed that if enterprise 
does not exist debt risk before and after the investment, then shareholders’ investment decisions of the 
debt enterprise would meet the principle of optimal value, there would not be debating agency cost. 
However, all of these studies are on the condition that the decision makers for the enterprise value 
maximization will choose the same bankrupt policy as shareholders, even though in the same bankrupt 
policy, debating enterprise still exists investment goals alienation, which will cause the investment 
inefficient. 
While, Fries et al. argued that shareholder insolvency does not meet the goal of corporate value 
maximization, so the indebted companies will have another agency problem, which is the agency 
problem of bankruptcy decision-making, by detailed analysing, they found that this agency problem 
will affect the optimal capital structure of the firm significantly. After discovering the agency problem 
of bankruptcy decision-making, Jian and LI further understood the importance of this agency problem 
under different debt levels, they argue that the moral risk caused by shareholders’ bankruptcy decision 
can be neglected under a certain debt level, but this agency problem under a higher and a lower debt 
level is more serious relatively. Correspondingly, Liu and Li studied the enterprise value loss caused by 
agency problem of shareholders’ bankruptcy decision, which is under different debt level. Based on 
this understanding, debt bankruptcy agency problem will affect enterprise operating value, and then 
control the project investment decision. Unfortunately, little literatures get involved into the enterprise 
investment decision under the bankruptcy agency, so it doesn’t fully revolved the influence of debt 
agency on enterprise investment bahaviors, including the influence of investment goals alination and 
bankruptcy decision agency problems.  
This paper attempts to use Real Option Method (ROM) to make a further study of enterprise 
investment decision under debt agency conflicts. Different from the existed literatures, this paper 
argues that the decision makers who maximize the enterprise value will hold the goal of value 
maximization not only in the investment decision but also in the bankruptcy decision, through the 
comparism with the shareholders benefits maximization, this paper also analyzes the inefficient 
investment that caused by shareholders’ investment goals alienation and bankruptcy decision agency, 
which will deepened the understanding of the relationship between debt agency conflicts and enterprise 
investment decision.  
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2. Hypothesis Development 
Considering an enterprise with risk neutral, there is an investment opportunity that is exclusive, and 
enterprise do not need to consider competitors to seize investment opportunity that will cause the 
possible of losing partial market when waiting for investment, so enterprise can choose to make 
investment appropriately based on its own condition. Once enterprise decides to make investment, 
there will be fixed investment cost I  to configure relevant production equipment, and the cost of the 
unit product produced by this equipment is C . We assume that the price of the product is tP  in the 
time point t , which follows the Geometric Brownian Motion 
tttt dWPdtPdP                               (1) 
  and  are constants, which represent the excepted growth rate and fluctuation rate of the price 
respectively, tdW  is the increment of the Stand Wiener Process under the risk neutral.   
In order to get partial investment funds, we assume enterprise can get perpetual debt financing L  
from external market when making investment. In order to get the corresponding credit funds, 
shareholders must commit to pay interests R  to creditors in per unit time. Due to the imperfection of 
the debt contract, creditors can not limit shareholders’ investment decisions effectively, but in order to 
maximize their own interests, they can only expect the shareholders’ business policy reasonably at the 
time of signing the contract and provide the corresponding loans at the level of payed interests. 
Assuming there is no information asymmetry between creditors and shareholders, creditors can 
understand shareholders’ operating policy completely after making investment, which makes creditors 
can estimate the intrinsic value of the debt funds at the time of debt happenning. Accordingly, creditors 
will provide debts that value equal with the investment to ensure the equity of the borrowing price, so 
enterprise debt financing L  is equal to the debt value at the time of investment. If the debt financing 
L  that provided by creditors is lower than the investment cost I , then the shortfall may be made up 
by shareholders’ own founds. If the L  is larger than I , the excess will be paid to shareholders as 
dividends. Because of the debt existing, shareholders will choose an appropriate chance to make 
bankruptcy. As long as the bankruptcy is not carried out, shareholders must pay for the debt interests 
with operation earning or its own funds. If making bankruptcy, shareholders do not to pay for the 
interests, but have to transferred the tangible assets to creditors, at this time, shareholders value will be 
zero. Put it simply, we assume the model as following: firstly, we assume there is none cost in 
bankruptcy, and creditors will get all of the tangible assets value; secondly, all the interests after tax 
will be dividends paid to shareholders, there is none returned earning in the enterprise; thirdly, the 
operation lose can deduct tax forward or backward indefinitely, unless bankruptcy, or the enterprise 
will own all the tax benefits of the current debt; finally, we assume that the manager can represent the 
interests of shareholders’ totally, there is not agent problem between managers and shareholders. 
 
3. Maximize Investment Decision of Shareholder’s Interests 
Assuming managers can represent the interests of shareholders fully, so enterprise will make 
investment decisions with the standard of maximizing shareholders’ interests. Set E  is the value of 
shareholders after the investment, it is a function of time t  and tP . After a certain period of time, the 
expected value of the stock right changed with time can be expressed as )(dEE . Once the investment 
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option is carried out, the enterprise will generate cash inflow ))(1( RCPt   in per unit time,   
is the corporate income tax rate. Therefore, the expected variation of equity value after unit time is 
dtRCPt ))(1(  + dE . Considering the risk neutral, in order to avoid arbitrage, the variation of 
equity value should equal to shareholders’ risk free return rEdt , r  is the risk free rate (to get the 
limited value, we assume r ). Therefore, the equity value after investment can be expressed by the 
following differential equation: 
rERCPPEEP PPP  ))(1(5.0 22              (2) 
In addition, the equity value must meet three conditions: condition (3) shows that when the price tends 
to infinitely great, there is no bankruptcy risk in enterprise, the equity value is the present value of the 
enterprise’s expected value after tax; condition (6) shows that under the mechanism of limited liability, 
shareholders will choose the best price 
S
dP  to make bankruptcy, then the ownership of the enterprise 
transferred to creditors, the equity value becomes zero; (5) is the first-order optimization conditions for 
the bankruptcy.  
))(1(lim
r
RC
r
PE
P
                         (3) 
( ) 0SdE P                                      (4) 
0S
dP P
E
P 
                                     (5) 
Simultaneous equation (2) and these 3 conditions, the equity value can be shown as equation (6). In 
equation 2 2( )( ) /[ ( 1)]
S
dP r C R r      , 2  is the solution when the characteristic equation
0)1(5.0 2  r  is small than zero. 
2( ) (1 )( ) (1 )( )( )
S
d
S
d
PP C R C R PE P
r r r r P
  
       
           (6) 
Set bond value after investment is B , which is similar to equity value, it can be present as differential 
equation (7), and there are constrain conditions (8) and (9), 
2 20.5 PP PP B PB R rB                             (7) 
rRB
P
/lim                                     (8) 
( ) ( )S U Sd dB P V P                                  (9) 
Condition (8) shows that when the price tends to infinitely great, shareholders will not carry out 
bankruptcy, creditors will receive a sustainable interest income; Condition (8) indicates that when the 
price trends to bankruptcy threshold 
S
dP , creditors obtain all of the tangible assets, now the debt value 
is equal to the value of debt-free enterprise at the point of bankruptcy. So, the creditors’ rights value 
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after investment can be present as equation (10):  
2( ) / ( ( ) / )( / )U S Sd dB P R r V P R r P P
                     (10) 
( )U SdV P  is the debt-free enterprise value at the point of bankruptcy threshold 
S
dP  after investment. 
Similar to the previous analysis, )(PV
U
 for the value of debt-free enterprise after investment can be 
obtained from equation (11) and its three constrain conditions. Condition (12) indicates that when the 
price tends to infinitely great, enterprise is going-concern and the enterprise value is sustainable present 
value of the profit after tax. (13) indicates that when the price falls to the breakeven point aP , 
enterprise will withdraw from business, and (14) is the first-order optimization condition for the 
enterprise to withdraw from business. It is worth noting that if the bankruptcy threshold point is smaller 
than the break-even point aP  of the debt-free enterprise, which indicates that there is none business 
value for creditors to own the enterprise after bankruptcy, at this point, the debt value is zero. After 
calculating, 2 2( ) /[( 1) ]aP r C r     , aP  is smaller than SdP  obviously, the enterprise took over 
by creditors still has going-concern value after bankruptcy, and the debt value is more than zero. 
UU
P
U
PP rVCPPVVP  ))(1(5.0 22                      (11) 
))(1(lim
r
C
r
PV U
P
                               (12) 
0)( aU PV                                    (13) 
0

 aPP
U
P
V                                 (14) 
Based on the valuation of equity and creditors’ rights after investment, next we will analyze the optimal 
investment policy 
S
eP  of shareholders. Set the option value before investment is F , it can express 
as equation (15), and meet three conditions (16)-(18): 
2 20.5 PP PP F PF rF                              (15) 
0)0( F                                    (16) 
)()()( LIPEPF se
s
e                              (17) 
s
e
s
e PPPP P
E
P
F
 


                           (18) 
Condition (16) indicates that when the price drop to zero, the option value of the investment is zero; 
(17) is the value matching condition of the investment decision in the case of maximizing shareholders 
interests, indicating that at the critical point, the option value is equal to equity value subtracts 
investment cost LI   for shareholders. (18) is the first-order optimization of investment conditions. 
Since the enterprise debt financing L  is equal to the debt value at the time of investment, so the 
condition (17) can also be expressed as equation (19). Obviously, according to the above equations, we 
can get the investment threshold 
S
eP : 
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( ) ( ) ( ( ))s s se e eF P E P I B P                         (19) 
 
4. Investment Decisions for Enterprise Value Maximization 
In order to test the inefficiency investment of shareholders, we consider the investment decisions for 
enterprise value maximization. Set 
FV  as the enterprise value after investment, obviously, it can be 
represented by differential equation (20), and must satisfied the conditions (21)-(23). 
2 20.5 (1 )( )F F FPP PP V PV P C R R rV                 (20) 
( ) 0F fdV P                             (21) 
0f
d
F
P P
V
P 
                            (22) 
r
R
r
C
r
PV F
P

  ))(1(lim                    (23) 
Condition (21) represents enterprise whole value is zero at price 
f
dP , at price 
f
dP  enterprise will 
carry out bankruptcy in order to maximize the whole value of shareholders and creditors. Condition (22) 
is the first-order optimization condition for bankruptcy; Condition (23) shows enterprise value when 
the price trends to infinitely great and there is risk-free for bankruptcy. According to these conditions, 
enterprise value after investment can present as equation (24): 
2 2( ) ( )(1 ) [1 ( ) ] ( )(1 )( )
f
F d
f f
d d
PP C R P C PV P
r r r P r r P
               (24) 
For 
2
2
( )[ (1 ) ]
( 1)(1 )
f
d
r C RP
r
   
 
     , obviously, if (1 ) 0C R    , so 0fdP  , which represents 
enterprise will not make bankruptcy forever (Note 1). To ensure the bankruptcy price meet the real 
economic characteristic that is non-negative, this paper only consider the condition (1 ) 0C R    . 
Comparing 
f
dP  and 
S
dP , we find that as long as R  is bigger than zero, then the later will bigger 
than the former constantly, which indicates decision makers who maximize the shareholders’ benefits 
will choose bankruptcy at a higher price point, when comparing with enterprise value maximization. 
From the above value assessment, we can solve the optimal investment threshold 
f
eP . Similarly, we 
get the option value before investment from equation (15), and must satisfy equation (16), differently, 
at the investment critical point, the value matching condition and its smoothing condition is (25) and 
(26). We use these conditions can get the optimal investment decisions for enterprise value 
maximization 
IPVPF fe
Ff
e  )()(                              (25) 
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f
e
f
e PP
F
PP P
V
P
F
 


                             (26) 
 
5. The Influence of Debt Agency Conflict on Corporate Investment Decision 
The above analysis shows that the optimal investment policy of the shareholders is 
S
eP , while the 
investment threshold for maximization of enterprise value is 
f
eP , so there will be non-optimization 
problems of shareholders’ decisions that caused by debt agency conflicts.  
First, as references in, for the projects after investment, decision makers for maximize shareholders’ 
benefits will choose non-optimization bankruptcy policy, which will lead to enterprise value losing. 
Since the valuation of investment projects is based on the expected bankruptcy policy, so the agency 
problems in bankruptcy decision-making will disturb enterprise investment policy. In order to test the 
impact of this agency problem, it is assumed that shareholders must choose a bankruptcy policy 
f
dP  in 
accordance with the rules of maximizing enterprise value after the project is invested. At this time, 
there is no agency problems for the bankruptcy decisions, shareholders can re-get the value estimation 
after investment, which can be equations (2), (3) and (16), and finally represent as equation (17). In 
addition, by comparing 
f
dP  and aP  we find that for the R  greater than zero, then 
f
dP  less than 
aP  always, which shows that the enterprise owned by creditors has been under the break-even point 
after bankruptcy, at this time, enterprise will not have any value, so, ( )
f
dB P  is zero. According to this 
constraint condition and combine equation (5) and equation (8) we can get the debt value at this point is 
equation (18). We set shareholders’ investment decision policy is 
( )S f
eP under the bankruptcy policy 
f
dP  for enterprise value maximization, which can be get by equations (15), (27), (28) and conditions 
(16), (17), (18). Comprising 
s
eP  and 
( )S f
eP , we can get the influence of agency conflicts of 
bankruptcy decisions on enterprise investment behavior.  
( ) 0fdE P                                    (27) 
2( ) (1 )( ) (1 )( )( )
f
d
f
d
PP C R C R PE P
r r r r P
  
       
               (28) 
2( ) / ( / )( / )fdB P R r R r P P
                         (29) 
Secondly, as the references have studied, even if the decision-makers who maximize the enterprise 
value choose the same bankruptcy policy with shareholders, but shareholders will focus on their own 
interests and try to maximize it when making optimized investment decisions, which will ignore 
creditors’ benefits and cause debt value losing, so shareholders’ decisions still deviate from the 
enterprise value optimization. Therefore, even if shareholders choose the bankruptcy policy 
f
dP  that 
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will maximize the enterprise value, and there is not agency problems for bankruptcy policy, but 
influenced by investment goals alienation, there are still inefficient in shareholders investment 
decisions. Comparing the differences between 
f
eP  and 
( )S f
eP , we can get the inefficient for 
shareholders’ investment decisions caused by investment goals alienation in the situation of none 
bankruptcy agency problems. Because we can not get the analytical expression of 
S
eP , 
( )S f
eP , and 
f
eP , this paper will further use numerical examples to study the influence of enterprise debt agency 
conflicts on enterprise investment behavoir.  
Table 1 lists enterprise investment policy under different debt levels and the option value 0( )F P  of 
corresponding projects under various investment operating policies. The data in the table shows that for 
all enterprises with liabilities bigger than zero, shareholders will choose investment decisions that 
deviate from enterprise value maximization. For example, when R  is 0.1, shareholders’ investment 
threshold 
S
eP  is 2.131, at this time, the optimal investment threshold 
f
eP  is 2.1456, that is, if you 
want to achieve the goal of enterprise value maximization, enterprise should make investment till price 
is up to 2.1456. Therefore, shareholders will make overinvestment under debt financing, and the 
overinvestment level will increased with debt level (see Table 2). In addition, from the point of 
bankruptcy decision-making, the debt corporate shareholders will choose strategic default bankruptcy 
when price is higher than bankruptcy threshold 
f
dP  that is the point of enterprise value maximization, 
which will cause bankruptcy decision agency problems. The data show that the gap between 
S
dP  and 
f
dP  will increase with the liabilities, which indicates that the higher of the liabilities the more serious 
of the agency problems of bankruptcy decision. Obviously, due to the impact of these agency issues, 
enterprises have produced the agency costs 0( )
fF P - 0( )
SF P . 
According to the previous analysis, the inefficiency of enterprise investment decisions not only comes 
from the direct influence of shareholders’ investment goals alienation, but also because of the indirect 
influence of the bankruptcy decision agent problems. In order to understand the influence mechanism 
of these two kinds of agency problems on shareholders’ investment behavior, Table 1 lists the 
shareholders’ investment behavior with the optimal bankruptcy policy 
f
dP , to make further 
comparison and analysis. 
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Table 1. Investment Policies and Relevant Enterprise Value in Different Debiting Levels 
Interests 
payment
R  
Shareholder’s benefits 
maximization 
Enterprise value 
maximization 
Shareholders’ benefits 
maximization with policy fdP  
S
eP  
S
dP  0( )
SF P  feP  
f
dP  0( )
fF P ( )S feP
f
dP  
( )
0( )
S fF P
0 2.2183 0.4226 5.3388 2.2183 0.4226 5.3388 2.2183 0.4226 5.3388 
0.1 2.131 0.4649 5.4711 2.1456 0.4018 5.4733 2.1319 0.4018 5.4732 
0.2 2.0424 0.5072 5.6059 2.0729 0.381 5.6162 2.046 0.381 5.6156 
0.3 1.9522 0.5494 5.7406 2 0.3602 5.7683 1.9607 0.3602 5.7669 
0.4 1.8601 0.5917 5.871 1.9271 0.3394 5.9306 1.8762 0.3394 5.928 
0.5 1.7656 0.634 5.9899 1.854 0.3186 6.1044 1.7924 0.3186 6.1 
0.6 1.6681 0.6762 6.0849 1.7808 0.2977 6.2908 1.7096 0.2977 6.2842 
0.7 1.5667 0.7185 6.1342 1.7074 0.2769 6.4915 1.6279 0.2769 6.4821 
0.8 1.4595 0.7608 6.0959 1.6339 0.2561 6.7083 1.5475 0.2561 6.6955 
0.9 1.3434 0.803 5.881 1.5601 0.2353 6.9433 1.4686 0.2353 6.9268 
1.0 1.2106 0.8453 5.2565 1.4862 0.2145 7.1992 1.3914 0.2145 7.1787 
1.1 1.0272 0.8876 3.121 1.4121 0.1937 7.4789 1.3162 0.1937 7.4545 
Note. r =6%、 I =5、 =2%、 =20%、 =0.33、C =1、 0P =1. 
 
Firstly, comparing 
S
eP  and 
( )S f
eP  we can find that 
( )S f
eP  will bigger than 
S
eP  constantly in 
enterprise with liability more than zero, which shows that the agency problems of bankruptcy decisions 
will accelerate the process of shareholders’ investment decision-making, and lead to overinvestment. In 
fact, with the protection mechanism of limited liability, shareholders can choose bankruptcy so long as 
equity value is approaching to zero, without waiting to the whole value is zero, this kind of strategic 
default bankruptcy is somewhat provides a risk protection for shareholders investment behavior. 
Because shareholders believe that even if the market performance is not satisfactory in the future, they 
can make bankruptcy decisions when the product prices fall to 
S
dP , at this time shareholders can only 
loose all of the previous equity investment; while when product price at 
f
dP  shareholders make 
bankruptcy decision, form the view of shareholders, the equity value is already zero, in order to make 
the enterprise equity value keep in non-negative situation and ensure enterprise effective operation in 
the process of price falling from 
S
dP  to 
f
dP , shareholders must continue to add own funds, which will 
lead to shareholders bear more losses. Therefore, shareholders’ strategic default bankruptcy 
opportunities reduce the worry in the future to face with market risk when they making investment 
decisions, which will show a stronger investment momentum. Because of shareholders’ strategic 
default bankruptcy and the resulting of over-investment, enterprise will suffer the agency costs 
( )
0( )
S fF P - 0( )
SF P , which account for the total debt agency cost 0( )
fF P - 0( )
SF P  about 95% to 99% 
of the share.  
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Secondly, Table 1 shows that for any enterprise with R  more than zero, 
( )S f
eP  will be less than
f
eP , 
which indicates that when we revolve the impact of bankruptcy decision agency problems, enterprise 
still will make overinvestment decisions under the influence of shareholders’ investment goals 
alienation. For this result, the literature thought this is due to shareholders pursuit for tax benefits 
overly. In fact, based on the rational man assumption, shareholders will weigh the size of expected 
bankruptcy losses in the process of pursuing for tax benefits, but they are different from the decision 
makers for enterprise value maximization, they will neglect the bankruptcy loose for creditors, which 
will cause non-optimization problems for investment decisions. 
Assuming that enterprise investment threshold is eP , then the investment time et  can be expressed 
as 0inf{ ( , ), }e t et t t P P    , equally, the enterprise bankruptcy time under the bankruptcy policy 
f
dP  can also be expressed as inf{ ( , ), }
f
d e t dt t t P P     (obviously, de tt  ), and assuming 
shareholders’ wealth loss because of bankruptcy is SBL , creditors’ wealth loss is DBL , we can get 
enterprise expected tax benefit is 
( )[ ]d e
e
t r t t
t
TB E e Rdt    when making investment, shareholders’ 
expected bankruptcy loss is 
( )[ ]d er t tSBL E e SBL   , creditors’ bankruptcy loss is 
( )[ ]d er t tDBL E e DBL   . Therefore, the net tax benefits profit of shareholders at the time of 
investment is 
STB BL , and for decision-makers who maximize enterprise value, the net tax benefits 
are  at this time. In order to achieve the net tax benefits maximization, at the specific 
bankruptcy policy 
f
dP  and special bankruptcy time dt , decision makers only can choose the optional 
investment time et  through adjusting investment policy. On the one hand, if the expected price 
increases in the future, enterprise will accelerate the process of investment, thereby increasing net value 
of tax benefits through decreasing et ; on the other hand, if the price declines, the sooner of the 
investment, the smaller of the gap between eP  and 
f
dP , and enterprise effective operating time 
d et t  will be shorter, at this time, enterprise will generate less excepted tax benefits and more 
expected bankruptcy loss, so decision makers will delay the investment. Because the decision makers 
who maximize enterprise value take into account the bankruptcy loss of both shareholders and creditors, 
comparing with shareholders, they will be more concern of wealth loss after price declining, so they 
will choose a higher investment threshold carefully, to ensure more effective operating time d et t  
and less excepted bankruptcy loss, so 
( )S f
eP  is smaller than 
f
eP , on the impact of investment goals 
S DTB BL BL 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp                Journal of Business Theory and Practice                 Vol. 7, No. 2, 2019 
86 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
alienation, shareholders will make overinvestment. Obviously, this over-investment behavior will lead 
to the agency costs 0( )
fF P -
( )
0( )
S fF P  and will account for approximately 1% to 5% of the total debt 
agency costs. 
The above analysis shows that the two kinds of agency costs 
( )
0( )
S fF P - 0( )
SF P  and 0( )
fF P -
( )
0( )
S fF P  have significant differences in quantity, while because the former is not the role of the 
purely investment decision distortions in bankruptcy agency conflicts, but includes the impact of the 
bankruptcy agency conflicts on enterprise value, so their quantity differences can not be used to 
measure the importance of investment decisions distortion under these two agency conflicts. In order to 
compare the importance of these two different kinds of investment decision distortions, Table 2 
describes the composition of enterprise investment decision distortions under the debt agency conflicts. 
The results show that, when R  is less than 0.8 constantly, the investment decision distortions caused 
by the investment goals alienation can explain the share of the total investment distortions more than 50% 
under debt agency conflicts, and when the ratio is greater than or equal to 0.8, more than half of the 
total share is decision distortions caused by bankruptcy agency conflicts, which shows that 
shareholders’ investment goals alienation at low debt level is the main driving force of enterprise 
investment decision distortions, and the influence of bankruptcy agency conflicts is more significant 
under high debt level. The results show that there is no high bankruptcy risk when there is a low debt 
level, and shareholders will make overinvestment in the purpose of pursuing tax benefits. At high debt 
level, influenced by high bankruptcy risk, shareholders will not make overinvestment or make 
investment in advance for earning more tax benefits, and the motivation for their early investment 
mainly comes from the risk protection for shareholders’ strategic default on bankruptcy opportunities 
under the limited liability mechanism, because if the price is rising in the future, and most of the 
proceeds of their investments will be owned by themselves, and if price is falling, they will make 
bankruptcy in advance in order to maximize their own interests and pass on the remaining risks to 
creditors. Therefore, in order to control the inefficiency of shareholders’ investment decisions under 
debt financing, low-debt enterprises should start from taxation factors, by reducing enterprise tax rate 
to reduce the expected tax benefits, and curbing the enthusiasm of shareholders to over-hold debt tax; 
for higher debt enterprises, be through the debt contract design, which will increase restrictions on 
shareholders’ earlier bankruptcy, or through institutional arrangements increase shareholders’ 
bankruptcy losses directly. 
 
Table 2. The Composition of Investment Decision Distortions under Different Debt Levels 
Interest 
Payment
R  
Total investment 
decision 
distortions 
Investment distortions caused by 
investment goals alienation 
Investment distortions caused by 
bankruptcy policy agency 
①degree of 
distortion 
②degree of 
distortion 
Proportion of total 
distortion 
③degree of 
distortion 
Proportion of 
total distortion 
f
eP －
S
eP  
f
eP －
( )S f
eP ②÷① ( )S feP －
S
eP  ③÷① 
0.1 0.0146 0.0137 93.84% 0.0009 6.16% 
0.2 0.0305 0.0269 88.2% 0.0036 11.8% 
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0.3 0.0478 0.0393 82.22% 0.0085 17.78% 
0.4 0.067 0.0509 75.97% 0.0161 24.03% 
0.5 0.0884 0.0616 69.69% 0.0268 30.31 % 
0.6 0.1127 0.0712 63.18% 0.0415 36.82%  
0.7 0.1407 0.0795 56.51% 0.0612 43.49% 
0.8 0.1744 0.0864 49.54% 0.088 50.46% 
0.9 0.2167 0.0915 42.22%  0.1252 57.78% 
1.0 0.2756 0.0948 34.4% 0.1808 65.6% 
1.1 0.3849 0.0959 24.92% 0.289 75.08% 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper studies the influence of debt agency conflicts on enterprise investment behavior by using 
real option method. It is different from the previous literatures that this article not only considers the 
influence of the investment goals alienation on the investment decisions without the bankruptcy agency, 
but also analyzes the investment decision distortions caused by the bankruptcy agency conflicts, which 
makes the relationship between the debt agency conflicts and the enterprise investment decisions more 
comprehensive. It is found that there is an over-investment phenomenon due to the debt agency 
conflicts. The motivation of over-investment is partly due to shareholders excessive pursuit of tax 
benefits under the influence of investment goals alienation. On the other hand, it comes from the 
protection of strategy default bankruptcy for shareholders’ investment risk, and at a lower debt level, 
the former is the dominant mechanism for investment decision distortions, and the impact of the latter 
is even more pronounced at a higher debt level. Although this paper makes quantification for the cost 
of debt agency caused by investment decision distortions under investment goals alienation, there 
should be a further study on the value quantification of pure investment decision distortions under 
bankruptcy agency conflicts, so as to stress the importance of these from the point of value loss. In 
addition, this article sets a variety of strict assumptions in the process of model constructing, such as 
the interests consistency of shareholders and managers, the information symmetry between creditors 
and shareholders, etc., gradually liberalize these assumptions should be the future study direction.  
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Note 
Note 1. If the tax-free clause allows enterprise to operate the loss to deduct tax forward or backward 
indefinitely, the enterprise does not exist the possibility of tax benefits losing, then this “business never 
bankrupt” situation can be objective. Because in this tax law environment, regardless of operating 
income, corporate interest payments can provide tax benefits of, so even if the product price dropped to 
zero, as long as bigger than the enterprise change cost after the tax, from the point of maximizing the 
enterprise value, continuing to run a business will be profitable. 
 
